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RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTCY-BILLS

NOTES-LIABILITY

AND

MENT BY MAKER IS VOID UNDER

BANKRUPTCY

OF INDORSER

WHERE

PAY-

Acr-The maker of a note

which was indorsed by the defendant, at maturity, paid its holder, the plaintiff.
Subsequently the maker became bankrupt, and his trustees recovered the money
from the- plaintiff as being a preferential payment to a creditor within four
months of bankruptcy.' There was evidence of notice of all essential facts to
the defendant, from which the court found a waiver of formalities. The
plaintiff now sues him as indorser upon the note. Held, that the indorser has not
been discharged. Horner v. First National Bank, 141 S. E. 767 (Va. 1928).
The court considers the question from the broader standpoint of whether
a surety in this situation will be discharged. To free him, there must be payment, or some inequitable act interfering with his rights or diminishing his
security.! The fact that the statute requires that, in order for the trustee to
recover the payment as a preferential one, at the time of payment the debtor be
insolvent, and the creditor have reasonable cause to believe that such payment
would effect a preference, does not make the act of accepting such payment an
inequitable act or fraud such as releases the surety
Far from being a
wrong, it inures to his benefit as a properly received payment. The debtor,
though insolvent, might never be forced into bankruptcy, in which case the
creditor would risk refusing a valid tender, and the surety have just cause for
complaint. The receipt of it is an act of proper diligence, and in case it
might have to be returned, the parties are merely in their original positions.
Some early cases decide that where the creditor knows there will be an illegal
preference, the surety is discharged, " but reason hardly supports this view.
The payment which actually frees the surety-in this case, an indorser-implies a valid payment and satisfaction. A payment contingent upon the
Bankruptcy Act is not sufficient, where it later proves void or illegal.'
2Sec.
6o (a and b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 STAT. 562 (1898),
U. S. C. (1925)

TIT. XI, § 96 (a and b) provides: "A person shall be deemed

to have given a preference if, being insolvent, he has, within four months before filing the petition

.

.

.

or

.

.

.

before adjudication

made a transfer of any of his property and the effect of such transfer . .
will enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt. . . . And [if] the person receiving it shall have reasonable cause to
believe . . . such . . . transfer would effect a preference, it shall be

voidable by a trustee."
'Swarts v. Fourth National Bank, 117 Fed. I, 8 Am. B. R. 673 (C. C. A.
8th, I9O2) ; BRANDT, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (3d ed. i9O5) §368.
'Hooker v. Blount, 44 Tex. App. 162, 97 S. W. 1o83 (I9o6). There is a
distinction between fraudulent preferences and transactions contrary to the
statute.
'Watson v. Pogue, 42 Iowa 582 (1876); National Bank v. Prewitt, 117
Tenn. 1, 96 S. W. 334 (i9o6) ; Northern Bank v. Farmers' Bank, III Ky. 350,
63 S. W. 604 (IpoI) ; BRANDT, supra note 2.
'lit re Ayers, 6 Biss. (U. S.) 48 (D. C. Wis. 1874); Northern Bank v.
Cooke, 76 Ky. 340 (0877).
"Harner v. Baldorf, 35 Ohio St. ii3 (1878). So, a payment by means of
a note that proves void for usury, is no payment releasing the surety. Mitchell
v. Cotton, 2 Fla. 136 (1848); Williams v. Gilchrist, ii N. H. 535 (1841).
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CONDITIONAL SALES-EFFECT OF UNIFORM SALES ACT IN PENNSYLVANIA-

A conditional vendee, in possession of certain machinery, delivered to it by the
conditional vendor, and by it attached to realty belonging to the defendant, sold
this machinery to the latter, which purchased bona fide and for value. Both
the conditional sale and the sale to the defendant occurred in 1923. The conditional vendor brought replevin against the defendant, contending that the Uniform Sales Act' had changed the Pennsylvania common law rule that a conditional sale was void against innocent purchasers from the conditional vendee in
possession.3 Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Anchor Concrete Machinery Co. v. Pennsylvania Brick & Tile Co., 14o At. 766 (Pa. 1928).
The decision is unquestionably correct, for the case is expressly covered by
a statute.3 However, in a very interesting dictun, the court directly answers
the plaintiff's argument, saying, "we are not convinced that the language employed in the act indicates a legislative intention to alter our long-established
rule. . . ." In so doing, the court belies a prophecy made about four years
ago,' and reaches a conclusion which is directly opposed by the present Illinois
law," although Illinois and Pennsylvania were in accord at common law," against
the strong weight of authority." The court first applies Section 23 (1), which
provides that a buyer from one not the true owner gets no better title than his
seller had ". . . unless the owner . . . is by his conduct precluded
from denying the seller's authority to sell," and then states, "The decisions in
Pennsylvania . . . have always been . . . that the transfer of possession in itself constituted such conduct, and the clause relied on does not require that further acts must be established to defeat the rights of the unpaid
vendor." But, as the Illinois court points out,' the seller should not be precluded unless his conduct amounts to a representation to the buyer, and mere
delivery of possession, even in Pennsylvania,' is never such a representation!'
The court proceeds, ". . . the Sales Act did not purport to deal with conditional sales, which were made the subject of a separate uniform law. .
An examination of the two acts shows it was not the purpose to define the
'Act of May I9, 1915, P. L. 543, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §§ 19649-19725.
2
Stadtfeld v. Huntsman & Co., 92 Pa. 53 (1879); i WILLISTON, SAILS (2d
ed. 1924) 753 n. 86.
Act of June 7, 1915, P. L. 866, PA. STAT. (West, i92o) §§ 19727-19734.
'Mueller, Conditional Sales in Pennsylvania Since the Adoption of the
Sales Act (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 121.
'Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432, 149 N. E. 225 (1925).
'Michigan Central R. R. v. Phillips, 6o Ill. 19o (1871); Brandage v.
Camp, 21 Ill. 330 (1859) ; IWILLISTON, lOc. cit. suqpra note 2.
"Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663 (1886); Oakland Savings Bank v.
California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295, 191 Pac. 524 (1920); Wentworth
v. Woods Machine Co., 163 Mass. 28, 39 N. E. 414 (895) ; I WILLISTON, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 750.
' Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, supra note 5, 318 Ill. at 434, 149 N. E. at 226.
'Miller Piano Co. v. Parker, 155 Pa. 208, 26 Atl. 303 (1893) ; Ditman v.
Cottrell & Sons, 125 Pa. 6o6, 17 Atl. 504 (1889) ; Dando v. Fields, 1O5 Pa. 74
(1884) ; Mueller, op. cit. supra note 4, at 138.
" Wilkinson v. King, 2 Camp. 335 (Eng. 18o9) ; Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long,
stepra note 5; McNeil v. Tenth Bank, 46 N. Y. 325 (1871) ; I WILI.ISTON, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 718; Mueller, loc. cit. supra note 9.
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rights of the purchasers from conditional vendees by the former legislation.
In the later statute . . . the interests of such parties are protected ...
By section 5,such transaction's are expressly made void as to innocent purchasers, unless the contract is made a matter of record within ten days, negativing the construction appellant would place on the effect of section 23 of the
Uniform Sales Act, which evidently was not intended to cover cases such as
now before us." It is unquestioned that the Sales Act was intended to cover
conditional sales as between the immediate partiese but the question as to
whether it was intended to cover the case where the conditional vendee sells to
an innocent purchaser has arisen only once before, in the Illinois case above
referred to.' In that case the court held that it was so intended, relying on
Section 2o. But that section applies only between the parties to the original
sale. Since, between the parties, the conditional vendee has no title under Section 18, which provides that,.in specific or ascertained goods, the property is
transferred to the buyer as the parties intend, a sale by a conditional vendee
is within the wording of Section 23, and so would seem subject to it. Nevertheless, the argument of the Pennsylvania court seems entitled to weight, as
indicative that, despite the wording, the present case was not intended to be
within the Act. As further indicative of this is the fact that the English Sale
of Goods Act," from which the Sales Act was modeled, expressly deals with
this precise case,' while the Sales Act omits that sub-section. Having reference
to the Pennsylvania common law rule, that the conduct of the vendor in delivering possession to the vendee was such as to preclude him from asserting his title
against an innocent purchaser, it would seem that the court's opinion of the
effect of the Sales Act in this situation is entirely justifiable.

CONFLCT

OF

LAWS-AATEMENT

OF

ACTIoN-WHAT

LAW

GoVERNs-

The plaintiff sued in Connecticut to recover for personal injuries caused in
New York by the defendant's intestate. In New York the common law rule
that actions for personal injuries abate on the death of the "tort-feasor was
in force. A Connecticut statute 1 provided that no cause or right of action
should be lost or destroyed by the death of any person, but should survive in
favor of or against the executor or administrator of such decedent. Held,
that the action has been extinguished by the law of New York and the Connecticut statute' cannot revive it. Orr v. Ahean, 139 Adl. 69i (Conn. 1928).
'It has been held under §20 (i) that the seller's reservation of title is
valid against the buyer. In re Seward Dredging Co., 242 Fed. 225 (917);
Dinsmore v. Maag-Wahmann Co., 122 Md. 177, 89 Atl. 339 (914) ; Penser v.
Marsh, 218 N. Y. 505, 113 N. E. 494 (i9i6). And under §22 it has been
held that the risk of loss is in the vendee after he obtains possession. O'NeillAdams Co. v. Eklund, 89 Conn. 232, 93 At. 524 (1915); Collerd v. Tully, 78
N. J. Eq. 557, 8o Atl. 491 (1911).
'Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, supra note 5.
(1894) 56 & 57 Vicr. C. 71.
"'Ibid. §25 (2).
'CONN.

GEN. STAT. (1918) § 6177.

RECENT CASES
The theory of the court in the principal case is that the question whether
a cause of action survives the death of the tort-feasor is a matter of substantive law, and therefore governed by the law of the place where the cause of
action arose. The only other case that can be found on the question holds
that the law of the deceased tort-feasor's domicile governs, although that was
also the place of the forum, the tort having been committed elsewhere? The
principal case involves the very fundamental question of jurisprudence: whether
a right can be said still to exist, where there is no remedy by which it may
be enforced. At common law, when an action abated on the death of the tortfeasor, was the plaintiff's right tolled, or did he lose only his remedy
and still retain his right otherwise unimpaired? Tending to support the
view that the right has been barred, it was held that, where the defendant
falsely imprisoned the plaintiff in Jamaica, and the Jamaica legislature later
justified the defendant's act, the plaintiff could not maintain an action in
England,' although that is a weaker case than the principal one because the
remedy was removed after the tort was committed. On the other hand, it
might be argued, in the principal case, that when the plaintiff's person was
invaded, he got a right under the law of New York which he could take with
him wherever he might go, and which any foreign court would permit him
to assert. It is not doubted that New York can prevent the plaintiff from pursuing that right in her own courts. But can she do anything more? Having
given the plaintiff this right, can she tell him what he may or may not do
with it outside of New York? It might be answered that the state does this
when it discharges a debtor in bankruptcy, in which case the discharge would
bar the plaintiff in any other place in which he might sue, if the discharge
took place where the contract was made or where it was to be performed.'
Still, that case is distinguishable, because of the plaintiff's voluntary entrance
into the relationship, by which he impliedly consents to be governed by the lex
loci cotractus,whereas the plaintiff in tort is an involuntary actor, and should
not have forced upon him the law of the place where he happened to be when
the tort was committed. Where the question arises whether the efflux of time
has barred a plaintiff's right, the courts hold that it pertains to the remedy
or procedure, and apply the law of the forum.' Where the question arises
whether a change in circumstances has barred a plaintiff's right, why should
it not also be a matter of remedy to which the rule of the forum may be
applied?
'Whitten v. Bennett, 77 Fed. 271 (C. C. Conn. 1896).
'Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. i (187o).
' Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. 6g8 (1854). Or if debtor and creditor are citizens of the state granting the discharge. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107
(1889).
'Thomas v. Clarkson, 125 Ga. 72, 54 S. E. 77 (I9o6); Louisville & N.
R. Co. v. Burkhardt, 154 Ky. 92, 157 S. W. 18 (1913); Conn. Valley Lumber
Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 78 N. H. 553, 1o3 At. 263 (I918) ; GOODRICH, CoxFLICT OF LAWS (1927)

168.
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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-CRIMINAL

PROSECUTION-STATUTORY

RIGHT

OF

ACCUSED TO WAIVE INDICTENT-The defendant was brought before a police
justice charged with burglary, and held to await the action of the grand jury.
Acting under the provisions of a statute,' he waived indictment and was arraigned on an information, to which he pleaded guilty. After sentence he obtained a writ of habeas corpus to test the validity of the statute. Held, that
the statute is unconstitutional. People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 131 Misc.
411, 227 N. Y. Supp. 142 (1928).
The court, in arriving at its decision, first determined that the provisions

of the constitution 2 were prohibitive and mandatory, and that they did not
operate merely to confer a right upon the individual, but also prescribed the
due process of lav required for the trial and conviction of one accused of a

crime. It is well established that the doctrine of waiver applies only where
the right is given to the accused alone, and not where it is given to the state or
public as well Although indictment has been held an essential element in the
4
prosecution of all infamous crimes in the Federal courts, the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution is not violated by state legislation providing

for the prosecution of such crimes by information,5 nor does "due process of
law" ' require a state to preserve the grand jury system.' But unless the constitution of a state expressly provides that the accused may waive indictment, or

unless its language may be construed as discretionary rather than mandatory, the
legislature is without power to abolish the system or to allow the accused the
right of waiver.8 Although indictment has been regarded as a purely personal
'N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 2: "All crimes prosecuted in a supreme
court, or in a county court, or in a city court, must be prosecuted by indictment. But, where a defendant has been held to answer to any of these courts,
that court, or any of said courts to which he might have been held to answer,
may, on the application in writing of the defendant, direct an information to
be filed against him for the offense for which he stands charged . . ."
'N. Y. CONSTITUTION, ART. I, Sec. 6: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime . . .unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury." These provisions are identical with those of U. S.
CONSTITUTION,

AMEND.

V.

'State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349 (1878); Cancemi v. People, I8 N. Y.
For a discussion of the right to a trial by jury see (1928) 76
128 (1858).
U. OF PA. L. REV. 727.
"Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. I (1887) ; Ex parte McClusky, 40 Fed. 71 (C.
C. Ark. 1889).
'Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833) ; Noles v. State, 24 Ala.
672 (1854); JOYCE, INDICTMENTS (2d ed. 1924) 46, and cases cited.
No State shall make or en'U. S. CONSTITUTION, AMEND. XIV: "....
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . "
" Hurtado v. California, IIO U. S. 516 (1884) ; State v. Jones, 168 Mo. 398,
68 S. W. 566 (I9O2) ; Com. v. Francies, 250 Pa. 496, 95 Atl. 527 (1915).
'People v. Granice, 50 Cal. 447 (1875) ; Wright v. State, I6 Ga. App. 216,
84 S. E. 975 (1915) ; State v. Queen, 9I N. C. 659 (1884).

RECENT CASES
right,' most courts consider it as a constitutional mandate, which is necessary to
give the court jurisdiction.10 It cannot, therefore, be waived.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INSANITY AT TIME OF TRIAL-CONSTRUCTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA MENTAL HEALTH AcT-The defendant was arraigned for mur-

der. His counsel moved for the appointment of a commission to preliminarily
inquire into the defendant's mental condition, under the Pennsylvania Mental
Health Act.1 The petition was supported by the affidavit of the resident jail
physician, that the defendant was not sane enough to make a defense. The court
received the reports, but decided that the sanity issue be tried by the trial jury,
along with a trial of the indictment. The defendant appeals from a judgment
of conviction. Held, that it is within the court's discretion, to follow the statutory procedure, or to submit the sanity issue to the trial jury. Commonwealth
v. Scovern, 292 Pa. 26, 14o Atl. 611 (1927).
At common law, no one can be tried for crime when his mental condition
at the time of trial is such that he cannot appreciate his position, and make or
co-operate in his defense.! The method of determining the sanity question lies
'Edwards v, State, 45 N. J. L. 419 (1883) where Depue, J., said, at 426;
"Exemption from prosecution without a presentment or indictment is essentially
a personal right of the same nature and quality as exemption from trial and
conviction except upon the verdict of a jury. Both these provisions were designed for the security of the personal rights of the individual by exempting
him, as a person, from conviction upon a criminal accusation otherwise than
is declared in the constitution, and the framers of that instrument aptly placed
both under the class of 'Rights and Privileges.'"
"°Exparte Bain, supra note 4; Rice v. State, 3 Heisk. 215 (Tenn. 1871);
Ethridge v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. App. 41, 172 S. W. 784 (1915).

I Act of 1923, P. L. 998, § 308, PA. STAT. (West Supp., I928 ) § 14726a-3o8:
"When any person detained in prison . . . awaiting trial . . . shall
in the opinion of the superintendent . . . or other responsible person, be
insane . . . the said superintendent . . . or other person, shall immediately make application . . . to a , . . judge of the court of
jurisdiction. . . . The said judge shall forthwith order an inquiry by
two . . . physicians, or by a commission . . . who shall immediately
examine the said person and make written report . . . If, in their opin-

..
ion, the person so detained is insane, the physicians shall so state .
The said judge may, in his discretion, summon other witnesses, and secure further evidence. If he is then satisfied that the person . . . is in fact insane, he shall order the removal of such person to a hospital.

.

.

."

This

act revokes the Act of 1874, P. L. i6o, and the Act of i86o, P. L. 427, § 67. In
Webber v. Commonwealth, iig Pa. 223, r3 Atl. 427 (1888), the court held that
the trial judge had discretion to allow the trial jury to determine the sanity issue,
under the Act of I86o, ignoring the Act of 1874, although that Act was pressed
on the court in argument.
'Youtsey v. U. S., 97 Fed. 937 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899); State v. Arnold, 12
Iowa 479 (1861) ; Commonwealth v. Hathaway, 13 Mass. 298 (1816). The test
is not the right and wrong test, but whether or not the defendant has the mental
capacity to make his defense. People v. Geary, 298 Ill. 236, 131 N. E. 652
(i921); State v. Noel, 131 AtI. 70 (N. J. 1925) commented on in (1926) 74
U. OF PA. L. REV. 507; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N. Y. 1847). Contra:
State v. Brodes, 16o La. 340, 107 So. 131 (1925) (right and wrong test adopted)
commented on in (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 883.

iooo
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within the discretion of the court, which can itself decide the question, impanel
a special jury to do so, or submit it to the trial jury, to be tried together with
the indictment.' In the principal case, the question was whether or not it was
mandatory on the trial court to preliminarily determine the prisoner's sanity.
In the words of the Act," when the preliminary requisites of the petition are
fulfilled, the judge "shall forthwith" order the inquiry. It would seem, therefore, that the only discretion allowed is in regard to the reception of additional evidence. Other states have enacted statutes covering the situation,'
some of which provide that a special jury or commission must or shall be appointed where a doubt as to the prisoner's sanity arises. It is generally held
under such statutes that the statutory procedure is not mandatory unless a
doubt actually arises in the court's mind. Other courts, in construing substantially similar statutes, have held that they confer no discretion, but that the
court must determine the sanity question, if it is properly raised, even if the
determination embarrasses and hinders the progress of the trial.7 It has even
been held that, where a statute seems merely to enact the common law, the
court must preliminarily determine the prisoner's mental health before the trial
can proceed.' While the separate determination of the question will tend to
slow up enforcement of the law, it should be remembered that to submit it to
the trial jury tends to confusion? However, regardless of the merits of the
Act, it is submitted that, by its wording, it was intended to confer a substantive
right on one accused of a crime to have the question of his sanity determined
before trial, of which the submission of the issue to the trial jury deprives him,
and not merely to give the courts a discretionary power.
DOWER-EFFECT OF ExmATERRITORL% DcanR oF DIVORcE UPoN DowER

RIGHTs-The plaintiff's assignor, a citizen of Ohio, had obtained a divorce in
Nevada, his wife having been served constructively. The plaintiff filed this
petition in the probate court for an order to sell the real estate of his assignor,
and the wife, who continued to claim her dower right, was made a party defendant. Held, that although the court would recognize the Nevada decree as
dissolving the marital status of the parties, it would not recognize it as divest'Queen v. Goode, 7 Ad. & E. 536 (Eng. 1837) ; Youtsey v. U. S., supra
note 2; State v. Cropper, 153 La. 545, 96 So. 1i6 (1923); Commonwealth v.
Hathaway, supra note 2; State v. Hagerty, 152 Minn. 5o2, 18.9 N. W. 411
(1922).

' Supra note i.
'In (1923) 14 J. CRim. L. 573, the special statutes are compiled.
'Granberry v. State, 184 Ala. 5, 63 So. 975 (913); People v. Gilberg,
Cal. 3o6,
178 (924)

son,

24

240

197

Pac. IOOO (1925); People v. Little, 68 Cal. App. 674, 23o Pac.

; State v. Church, ig9 Mo. 605, 98 S. W. i6 (i9o6) ; State v. PeterMont. 81, 68 Pac. 8o9 (i9oo) (rev'd on other grounds) ; In re Maass,

io Okla. 3o2, 61 Pac. 1057 (900).

Cf. People v. McElvaine,

125

N. Y. 596,

26 N. E. 929 (1891). If the court abuses this discretion it is reversible error.
Fralick v. State, 25 Ariz. 4, 212 Pac. 377 (1923) ; People v. West, 25 Cal. App.
369, 114 Pac. 794 (914).
'State v. Roselot, 69 Ohio St. 9i, 68 N. E. 825 (1903) ; Stewart v. State,
124 Wis. 623, 1o2 N. W. io79 (igo5).
I Ramirez v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. 236, 241 S. W. 1020 (1922).

"Ramirez v. State, supra note 8.

RECENT CASES

10OI

ing the wife's dower right. Snyder v. Buckeye State Building & Loan Co.,
i6o N. E, 37 (Ohio 1927).

It is a well-established common law rule that a divorce a vinculo deprives
the wife of her right of dower, regardless of which party secured the divorce
or whose fault formed the ground for it.' But by statute in many jurisdictions,2
if the wife secures the divorce for her husband's fault, her dower right is not
barred. Further, it is generally held that a valid decree of divorce granted by
a competent court of another state, having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the parties, has the same effect as a divorce granted by a local court."
But where only one party is domiciled in the foreign state and the defendant
has not been personally served, the United States Supreme Court has held'
that the "full faith and credit clause" of the Constitution' does not require the
courts of other states to recognize the decree. The court in the principal case
held that, on grounds of public policy, a decree obtained in a foreign state in
this manner would be recognized as effecting a dissolution of the status of marriage in Ohio; but that the wife's dower right, being an Ohio property right,
could not be divested by a foreign court which had obtained jurisdiction over
her by constructive service. This view is supported by a number of cases which
hold that a divorce granted in another state, for a cause which is not ground
for divorce in the state where the land lies, does not operate to divest the wife's
dower right (under statutes providing that a divorce granted for certain causes
bars the right of dower), even though the foreign divorce does change the
status of the parties in the state where the land lies.' These cases establish a
right of dower, independent of the status of marriage. But since the status of
marriage is dissolved, the woman ceases to be the wife of the man and upon
his death cannot become his widow. Logically, therefore, she cannot be given a
right of dower, on his death, as his widow. Practically, however, the result
reached by the principal case is very desirable, for it eliminates any possible
confusion in the status of the parties, and at the same time prevents the real
injustice which would result if the wife could be deprived of her dower right
by a decree in a suit which she did not have a reasonable opportunity to contest.
INSURANcE-TTiE

OF THE INSUR---TENANT

3Y THE ENvnta-Y-The

plaintiff took out a fire insurance policy in the defendant company, the policy
containing a clause to the effect that "this policy shall be void if the interest
of the insured be other than sole and unconditional ownership." In fact the
premises were held by the plaintiff and his wife as tenants by the entirety. In
'Barrett v. Failing, III U. S. 523 (1884); Pullen v, Pullen, 52 N. J. Eq.
9, 28 At. 719 (1893); Gallagher v. Gallagher, io1 Wis. 202, 77 N. W. 145
(,898).

'See Note, ANN. CAS. 1914B 665.
'Boyles v. Latham, 61 Iowa 174, 16 N. W. 68 (1883); Chapman v. Chapman, 48 Kan. 636, 29 Pac. 1O7I (1892) ; McGill v. Denting, 44 Ohio St. 645,
iI

N.

E. 118 (1887).

'Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (ipo6).

'Art.

IV, § I.

'Lynn v. Sentel, 183 Ill. 382, 55 N. E. 838 (i899) ; Van Cleaf v. Burns,
118 N. Y. 549, 23 N. E. 88I (i8go); Van Blaricum v. Larson, 205 N. Y. 355,
98 N. E. 488 (1912).
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an action on the policy, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was not the
sole and unconditional owner of the property, and that therefore the policy was
avoided. Held, that the plaintiff can recover. McNeil v. Connecticut Fire Ins.
Co., 24 F.(2d) 221 (W. D. Ten. 1928).
It is generally recognized that when an insurance policy contains a sole
and unconditional ownership clause, and the insured is not the sole and unconditional owner, the policy is avoided, because the risk to the company is greater
than that which it contracted to undertake if there is an outstanding interest
in some third party.! Therefore the sole question in such cases is whether or
not the insured is the sole and unconditional owner. In strict legal theory, a
tenancy by the entirety is a joint tenancy modified by the common law doctrine
"that the husband and wife are one legal entity Each spouse is deemed to be
seised of an undivided moiety of the whole per tout et non per my, while joint
tenants are seised of the whole of an undivided moiety per tout et per my.3
Therefore it is clear that in a joint tenancy neither tenant is the sole and unconditional owner, because his co-tenant is directly seised of an undivided portion of the whole. In the principal case, however, the court reasoned that, as
the parties were a legal entity, each being seised through the other of the
entire premises, the husband was seised of the whole as a sole and unconditional
owner, his ownership being subject merely to his wife's contingent right of survivorship. The answer to this contention seems to be that, in spite of the peculiar nature of the tenancy, as the wife's interest is as great as her husband's,
the anomalous condition arises of having two sole and unconditional owners.'
However, in justification of the principal case, it must be said that in many
jurisdictions the common law of tenancy by the entirety has been either modified
by custom or entirely changed by statute, naturally tending to create great confusion in regard to the question, and to lessen the value, as precedents, of the
arguments and decisions of the courts which hold to the contrary.'
MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT-FRAUDULENT

MISREPRESENTATION OF INTENT TO

HAVE REUIOUS CEREMONY-The plaintiff was induced to submit to a civil

marriage with the defendant by the latter's promise that he would go through a
religious ceremony immediately thereafter. In fact, he had never intended to
perform his promise, and refused to change his mind after the civil ceremony.
No cohabitation having taken place, the plaintiff brought this suit for annulment. Held, that there was sufficient fraud to nullify the marriage. Aufiero v.
A4ufiero, 222 App. Div. 479, 226 N. Y. Supp. 611 (1928).
'Ballard v. Globe, 237 Mass. 34, 129 N. E. 290 (1921) ; Syndicate Ins. Co.
v. Bohn, 65 Fed. 165 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Keating,
86 Md. 130, 38 Atl. 29 (1897).
'Ades v. Caplin, 132 Md. 66, lO3 Atl. 94 (1918); Pray v. Stebbins, 141
Mass. 219, 4 N. E. 824 (1886) ; I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. I920) 656;
(1928)

76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 470.
22 BL Comm. *182.

SSchroedal v. Humboldt Fire Ins. Co., 158 Pa. 459, 27 Atl. 1077 (893);
;Etna Ins. Co. v. Resh, 40 Mich. 241 (i879).
'Clauson v. Citizens Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 121 Mich. 591, 8o N. W. 573
(1899); Western Assurance Co. v. White, 171 Ark. 733, 286 S. W. 804 (1926);
Turner v. Howe Ins. Co., 195 Mo. App. 138, I89 S. W. 626 (I916).
a2 JOYCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1917) § Io48a.
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Fraud as to any material fact justifies the avoidance of an agreement to
marry or any other civil contract because it shows a lack of real consent. But
in contracts of marriage, the same public policy which prevents husband and
wife from altering the marital duties imposed by law once the contract has
been effected,1 also prevents the courts from recognizing the lack of consent
in the contract itself, except where the fraud goes to the very essence of the
marriage relationship.? There is considerable confusion, however, as to what
misstatements reach the essence
It has been held that they must make impossible the performance of the ordinary duties imposed by the marriage contract,' but the tendency is toward greater liberality.' Fraudulent misrepresentations of intention have been held to reach the essence of the contract in strong
cases, as where one of the parties intended never to cohabit with the other.'
But the New York courts, due to a very liberal construction of their statute,'
are alone in holding that such a promise as in the principal case is ground
for nullification
Under other situations, courts have failed to recognize that
where fraudulent misstatements conducive to marriage are made in order to
satisfy the religious scruples of the other party, such statements destroy the
necessary consent? The correctness of these decisions, according to the better
opinion, would depend upon whether the ma--iage had been consummated by
cohabitation. Until consummation, the public interest in the permanence of the
marital ties is comparatively slight, and ordinary fraud should be sufficient
to permit avoidance. 0 In many states, however, this distinction is not recognized.'
12 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION (6th ed. I92i) §§ i077,
1078.

2
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 30 Pa. 417 (1858). Cf. Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. 196
(1882) ; ScHOULER, op. cit. supra note I, § 1138.
'See Note, The Annulment of Marriage on the Ground of Fraud (925)
73 U. OF PA. L. REV. 195.

'Lyon v. Lyon, 230 II1. 366, 82 N. E. 850 (1907); Trask v. Trask, 114
Me. 6o, 95 AtI. 352 (1915).
5
Brown v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, 117 Atl. 114 (1922), on which see comment in (1922) 71 U. OF P. L. REv. 85; Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174
N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63 (19o3). See also comment in (1915) 63 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 460.
6
Bolmer v. Edsall, go N. J. Eq. 299, io6 Atl. 646 (i919); Anders v. Anders, 224 Mass. 438, 113 N. E. 203 (1916).

"N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1139, authorizing the annulment of a marriage on
the ground that the consent of one of the parties thereto was obtained by fraud.
See Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, supra note 5.
"In accord with the principal case: Rutstein v. Rutstein, 221 App. Div.
N. Y. Supp. 688 (927) ; Watkins v. Watkins, 197 App. Div. 489, 189
(1921).
Cf. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N. Y. 74, i5o N. E. 605
(1926). Contra: Wells v. Talham, i8o Wis. 654, 194 N. W. 36 (1923).
"Oswald v. Oswald, 146 Md. 313, 126 Atl. 81 (1924); Boehs v. Hanger,
69 N. J. Eq. 10, 59 Atl. 9o4 (io5) ; Wells v. Talham, supra note 8.
10
Ysern v. Horter, 91 N. J. Eq. i89, 11o Atl. 31 (1920). Cf. Woodward
v. Heichelbach, 97 N. J. Eq.'253, 128 Aft. 169 (1925) ; and see Griffin v. Griffin, 122 Misc. 837, 204 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1924); 1 BisHOP, MARRIAGE:, DiVoRCE, AND SEPARATION (new ed. i89i) §§ 456, 461.
'Hull v. Hull, i91 Ill. App. 307 (1915); Weir v. Still, 31 Iowa lO7
(187o) ; see Leavitt v. Leavitt, 13 Mich. 452 (I865).
70, 222
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POWER

OF A CITY TO ESTABLISH AN AIRPORT

-The city of Wichita had acquired land for a public park. The defendants,
the park commissioners, devoted a portion of the park to use as an airdrome.
The city brought this bill to have such use enjoined. Held, that the establishment of an airport is within the "park purposes" and the injunction should be
refused. City of Wichita v. Clapp, 263 Pac. 12 (Kan. 1928).
A city can aevote a park to any purpose which tends to promote popular
enjoyment and recreation.' A city may grant the use of part of a park as a
public stage route,2 and may maintain a pleasure drive around its borders 3 It
has been held that parks may be used for race meets,' and for tennis courts.9
A use by the city of park property as a municipal golf course has been sustained! In State v. Dodge," it was held that a park may be used as a public
tourist camp, which is closely analogous to the use in question. It would
seem that a city could erect an airport without recourse to the "park purpose"
doctrine, under its implied powers to enter into certain types of business. A
city can engage in business connected with highways,' which would logically
include engaging in business connected with aviation highways, of which airdromes are very essential parts. In Pennsylvania, cities and counties have
express power, by statute, to erect and maintain airports.9 The principal case
furnishes an interesting illustration of the way in which courts act, without
legislative aid, to meet the ever changing conditions of modem life.
PROXIMATE CAUSE-TELEGRAM INACCURATELY DELivEREm-The plaintiff
company sent its agent a telegram reading: "Offer Marathon six seventy basis
" The message as delivered by the defendant telegraph company read:

"Offer Marathon six twenty basis . . ." The defendant knew that the
plaintiff was a flour manufacturer, that Marathon was a brand of flour and that
the plaintiff manufactured other brands, but not, as was the fact, that the prices
on these other brands were controlled by the quotations on Marathon. The
CYc. 936; DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 1o96.
'American Steel House Co. v. Willcox, 38 Misc. 571, 77 N. Y. Supp. Io
228

(1902).

'Commonwealth v. Beaver Borough, 171 Pa. 542, 33 At. 112 (1895).
'Holtz v. Diehl, 26 Misc. 224, 56 N. Y. Supp. 841 (1899).
Cf. City of
Nebraska City v. Nebraska City Speed and Fair Assoc., io7 Neb. 570, 186 N.
W. 374 (1922).
'Caulfield v. Berwick, 27 Cal. App. 493, 150 Pac. 646 (1915).
'Copen v. City of Portland, 112 Or. 14, 228 Pac. io5 (1924), annotated in
(1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REV. 213.
1123 Kan. 316, 255 Pac. 387 (1927).
'Nicholls v. Charlevoix Circuit Judge, 155 Mich. 455, 120 N. W. 343
(19o9); City of New York v. Brooklyn City R. R., 232 N. Y. 463, 134 N. E.
533 (1922), annotated in (1923) 57 Amr. L. REv. 284. Cf. Commonwealth v.
Pittsburgh, 183 Pa. 202, 38 Atl. 628 (1915).
9
9Act of 1927, P. L. io2o; Act of 1925, P. L. 614; Act of 1923, P. L. 295;
all in PA. STAT. (West, Supp. 1928) § 46oa-I, et seq. In Georgia, the city of
Atlanta is given express authority to erect airdromes. GA. ACTS 1927, Act 364,
§ 4. In Montana and Ohio, any city is given express authority to erect airports.
MONTANA 1927 SESSION LAWS, C. 20; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926)

par. 15.

Cf. MASS. ACTs 1924, c. 368.

§ 3677,
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plaintiff's agent sold various brands with reference to the price quoted on
Marathon, and the plaintiff claimed damages for the loss occasioned. Held,
that the plaintiff could recover. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. BowenOglesby Milling Co., 2 S. W. (2d) 23 (Ark. 1928).
When a telegraph message as originally written reasonably informs the
company's agent that the message is one of business importance, and discloses
the transaction so far as is necessary to accomplish the purpose for which it is
sent, the company, under the well-established rule, is liable for all the damages
directly and proximately resulting from the negligent acts of its agents in failing to transmit the message in the form in which it is delivered The generally
adopted view in this country,' which is followed by the Arkansas courts," in
determining whether a particular negligent act is the proximate cause of the
injury, is that if the injury is such as ought reasonably to have been foreseen
in the light of the attending circumstances, the negligent act is the proximate
cause of such injury. However, under this view, it is not necessary that the
particular injury which did happen, or its particular form, should have been
actually foreseen; it is sufficient that the injuries are such as are likely, under
ordinary circumstances, to result from the act or omission in question.' Applying this foresight of the reasonable man test to the facts in the principal
case, it does not seem that the injury is the proximate result of the defendant's
negligence. No notice of the special circumstances attached to this telegram
was given to the company, nor can it be said that the situation and the loss
attending it are such as ought to have been reasonably foreseen. That the
company should be liable for all the loss might well be sustained under the
English rule that the foresight test is only to be applied in determining the
negligence, and that this having been established, the defendant is then liable
for all the loss that occurs, whether it ought to have been foreseen or not, in
the absence of any intervening cause.' It is not thought that the Arkansas
court intended to accept the English rule and abrogate its previous holdings."
Although in theory it seems to have done so, the decision was apparently influSPostal Tel. Cable Co. v. Lathrop, I3 Ill. 575, 23 N. E. 583 (1890);
Brook v. Western Union Tel. Co., 26 Utah 147, 72 Pac. 499 (903) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Milton, 53 Fla. 484, 43 So. 495 (1907) ; JONEs, TELEGRAPH
AND TELEPHONE COMPANIES (igi6) §§ 528 et seq., and cases cited.
2 Stone v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., i71 Mass. 536, 51 N. E. 1 (1898) ; Missouri Malleable Iron Co. v. Dillon, 2o6 Ill. 145, 69 N. E. 12 (1903); Hoag v.

Lake SlIore, etc., R. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293 (1877); Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Kellog, 94 U. S. 469 (1876).
St. Louis, K. & S. E. R. R. Co. v. Fultz, 9I Ark. 26o, I2O S. W. 984

(Igog) ; Helena Gas Co. v. Rogers, io4 Ark. 59, 147 S. W. 473 (1912).
'Pulaski Gas Light Co. v. McClintock, 97 Ark. 576, 134 S. W. 189

(1911) ; Hill v. Winsor, I18 Mass. 251 (1875) ; Schumaker v. St. Paul, etc., Ry.
Co., 46 Minn. 39, 48 N. W. 559 (i89i) ; Towboat Co. v. Western Union Tel.
Co., r24 Ga. 478, 52 S. E. 766 (i9o5) ; Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363, 21 Atl.
31 (1891).
'Smith v. London & South Western Ry. Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 21 (i87o);

Weld-Blunden v. Stephens, [i92o] A. C. 983; In re Polemis and Furness,
Withy & Co., Ltd., [1921] 3 K. B. 560.
'Supra note 2.
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enced by the fact that the difference between Marathon and the other brands of
flour sold was a constant, so that the loss was the same as if all the flour sold
had been Marathon.' If such had been the situation, the defendant's negligence
would, under the foresight test, have been the proximate cause of the entire loss.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE-PRICE MAINTENANCE CONTRAcTs-The plaintiff was
the sole English distributor of Palmolive soap, and the defendant was a chain
store proprietor. In consideration of wholesale discounts to be allowed by
the plaintiff, the defendant agreed, inter alia, not to sell Palmolive soap, "howsoever acquired," to the public under a certain price. The defendant obtained
Palmolive soap from a French source and sold it below the agreed price. Held,
(one justice dissenting), tlat the agreement is valid as not in unreasonable
restraint of trade; and that the price-cutting be enjoined. Palmolive Co. (of
England) v. Freedman, [1928] I Ch. 264 (Court of Appeal).
This is apparently the first case either in England or America to expressly
deal with contracts to maintain the resale price of goods not sold by one of the
contracting parties.' As such it marks an extension of the already "liberal"
attitude of the English courts in permitting price maintenance and other restraint of trade agreements if not unreasonable (I)as to the public and (2) as
between the parties? Even the dissenting justice agrees' that the contract is
not unreasonable as to the public, because the soap of this particular plaintiff
is in no way essential to the community. And the majority of the court holds
it not unreasonable as to the defendant, distinguishing it from (I)agreements
for service, where there is less freedom of contract, and (2) agreements where
the restraint prevents a party from carrying on his accustomed trade altogether;
pointing out that the contract here imposes a restriction only as to a certain article of a particular manufacturer, leaving the defendant free to sell both the same
and different kinds of articles of other manufacturers, and to carry on his

From the opinion: "The damages claimed for actual loss on the sale of
all the flour are no more than would have resulted from the sale of Marathon
alone on the basis of the quoted telegram as negligently transmitted and delivered, and the damages

. . . cannot be said not to have been the proxi-

mate result thereof or not in contemplation of the parties when the telegram
was sent."
'The practical identity of the plaintiff with the soap manufacturer distinguishes this situation from that in which a wholesaler (for example) agrees
not to sell the goods of a competing manufacturer under a certain price, or not
to sell them at all. Such an agreement, if operating to substantially lessen competition- or tending to monopoly, is made illegal in the United States by the
Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (914),

U. S. C. (1925)

TIT. XV, §i4.

'This attitude was taken in the early case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, I P.
Wins. i81, i96 (Eng. 17I); reannounced in Nordenfelt's Case, [1894] A. C.
at 565, and Morris v. Saxelby, [1916] i A. C. 688; and applied to resale agreements in Elliman, Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Son, [i9oi] 2 Ch. 275, and the
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. cases, [I915] A. C. 79 and ibid. 847.
'At page 277. For the similar statements of the other justices, see pages
274 and 282.
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business substantially as before. With this finding, and with the authority of
previous cases' for the proposition that price maintenance agreements may be
valid if reasonable, it seems that the court, in looking at the plaintiff's side of
the contract, was not unreasonable in holding that in order for the agreement
to be effective it was not only reasonable, but necessary,' to extend its operation to soap acquired from sources other than the plaintiff. If this were not
so, the whole object of the plaintiff might be defeated. In the United States,
on the contrary, such price maintenance contracts, even without the "howsoever acquired" feature, have been held invalid (though by divided courts),
either under the Sherman Act,8 as contracts in restraint of trade, or under the
Federal Trade Commission Act,' as methods of unfair competition'
But as
both Acts are very general in their terms-the Sherman Act denouncing "every
contract . . . in restraint of trade" on one hand, and being interpreted
to refer only to unreasonable restraints;' and the Federal Trade Commission
Act simply declaring "unfair methods of competition . . . unlawful,"

'At pages 272 and 281.
'Elliman, Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Son, supra note 2. Though in the
Dunlop cases, supra note 2, the validity of such agreements was not the point
directly before the House of Lords, they were treated as valid throughout the
proceedings; and so these decisions may be regarded as authority similar to
that of the Elliman case. See 164 L. T. at 264.
"At page 285. The dissenting opinion is based not on a difference in principler but on a feeling that the contract is unreasonable as between the parties,
as a "one-sided and catching agreement" (page 279) without mutuality of obligation. This argument is dealt with by the other justices at pages 286, 287.
"In the cases discussed infra note io there were the following dissents:
Miles case. Holmes, J.; Schrader case, Holmes and Brandeis, JJ.; BeechNut case, Holmes, Brandeis, McReynolds, and McKenna, JJ.
'26 STAT. 209 (i8go), U. S. C. (1925) TiT. XV, § i.
'38 STA'r. 719 (914), U. S. C. (1925) TIT. XV, §45.
0 The law as to resale price maintenance in the United States seems to be
in the following condition:- (i) Any contract of such nature is invalid (Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. Parke & Sons, 220 U. S.373 [i911]) and illegal (United
States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S.85 [1920]) whether express or implied from course of dealing or other circumstances (Frey & Son v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 256 U. S.2o8 [1921]). (2) This restriction may easily be avoided
by the manufacturer creating a relation of agency instead of that of buyer
and seller, and retaining title in himself until sale to the consumer (United
States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S.476 [1926]); though the court will
investigate to see that the agency is not a mere pretense (Miles case, supra).
(3) The result of price maintenance may also be obtained by the manufacturer
suggesting prices and refusing to sell to price cutters (United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U. S.300 [i919]). A man is still free to choose with whom he
will deal. (4) But the manufacturer may not go farther and employ spies, use
secret package marks, etc., for the sole purpose of ferreting out price cutters
(Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S.44I [192I]).
(5) The line distinguishing the situations of the Colgate and the Beech-Nut
cases is extremely tenuous, and cases in the middle ground reach different decisions on but slightly different facts. See Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, iiF.(2d) 337 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), comparing American Tobacco Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 F.(2d) 570
(C. C. A. 2d, 1925) with Hill Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 F.(2d)
481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
'See cases cited in 15 U. S. C. A. § i, 65.
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leaving the determination of what is unfair to the courts'---it may be said
that the American law on the subject is judicially made almost to the same
degree as the English law; ' and that the divergent views of the two countries
result simply from a variance in economic theory" as to the desirability of resale price maintenance agreements, shaped to some extent in the United States
by legislation, but mainly dependent on the personnel of the courts.'

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH

ABATEmENT-DEFECT

IN

QUALTY-An

agreement had been made for the sale of certain real estate. At the time of signing the contract the defendant vendor incorrectly stated that the rentals of the
described premises were a certain amount. After the plaintiff vendee had conveyed some land in part payment, he brought this bill for specific performance
with an abatement of the purchase price proportioned to the difference between
the actual rental value of the property and that stated by the defendant. No allegations as to scienter or reliance were made. The lower court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint as insufficient. The defendant appealed. Held
(one justice dissenting), that the judgment be reversed. Radel v. One Hundred
Thirty-Four West Twenty-fifth St. Bldg. Corporation, 226 N. Y. Supp. 56o
(1928).'

The doctrihe of specific performance with abatement has been long established in the law.2 Various reasons have been given for its application. The
real basis for it seems to be a desire of the court to place the parties as near
"Beech-Nut case, supra note io, at 453.
There is no English statute with provisions similar to those of the Sherman Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act applicable to this subject.
" Proponents of price maintenance assert that price cutting demoralizes
business, forcing the manufacturer to either reduce his profits or his quality,
to meet the substitutes offered by price cutters unless he reduces his price to
them. Opponents of price maintenance, on the other hand, assert that the
policy works to perpetuate the inefficient and unfit in business and raise costs
to the public. For articles supporting either view, see Rogers, PredatoryPrice
Cutting As Unfair Trade (0913) 27 HARV. L. REV. 139, and Dunn, Resale Price
Maintenance (923) 32 YAE L. J. 676. It is interesting to note that Mr.
Rogers was one of counsel appearing in favor of price maintenance in the

Miles case, supra note io; and that Mr. Dunn appeared on the government's
brief against price maintenance in the Colgate case, supra note io.
"See note 7 supra. Says Holmes, J., in the dissenting opinion of the
Miles case, supra note io at 411: "There is no statute covering the case; there
is no body of precedent that by ineluctable logic requires the conclusion to
which the court has come. The conclusion is reached by extending a certain
conception of public policy to a new sphere. On such matters we are in
perilous country." While this opinion was rendered before the passage of
the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914, it is apparent from the dissent in
the Beech-Nut case, supra note IO, at 457, that Mr. Justice Holmes did not
feel that the passage of the later Act required a different attitude.
' For the purposes of this paper the tort question of scienter and reliance
have been dismissed and the discussion restricted to the equity problem.
'See Lewis, Specific Performance of Contracts (1902) 50 Am. L. REG.
329.

'See Note (1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 476; (1926) 4 TEX. L. REV. 376.
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as possible to the position in which they would have been had there been no
misrepresentation,' the relief given being a matter of the court's discretion.'
Many courts in granting relief have used the terms "title and quantity."' This
is perhaps attributable to the fact that most cases have arisen from conflicts
as to a deficiency in the quantity of land or a defect in the vendor's title. The
principal case would limit relief to that extent. Many cases and text-writers
have, some of them perhaps unwittingly, indicated that they would go beyond
that and include quality," and value;' and still other cases have gone outside
of the agreement itself, and held the abatement applicable even to something
-collateral to the principal res.' It has been said that relief should be limitedi
only by inability to find an adequate and certain measure of damages.u In
order to grant relief, the court must first have obtained jurisdiction of the
principal res, and then to avoid a multiplicity of suits, i. e., a suit at law for
damages, an abatement is given for the deficiency. Since equity follows the
law, it would be improper, in any case, to grant relief unless some substantive right is involved. Since New York does not give a remedy for an innocent misrepresentation, to give relief under the facts alleged would therefore
be to allow in equity what the law in an action of deceit would deny.u The
aim of the cases is to give a complete resU but in doing this they must avoid
going too far afield into collateral matters, as it tends to take them beyond the
ordinary field of equitable jurisdiction in granting relief as to land§? If in the
principal case the statements as to rent were a part of the contract, the problem as to whether or not it would be included in the terms quality or value
would seem to be a debatable one.1 It is true, however, that the courts have
'See 40 HARv. L. Rav. supra note 3.
'Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, 567 (U. S. I869).
'See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1436 and cases cited; Hill v. Buckley, 17 Ves. 394 (Eng. I811).
"See PoMEROY, SPECIFIc PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926) § 434
(quantity, quality or value); 25 R. C. L. 249; I DART, VENDORS AND PURCHASmS (7th ed. 19o) 675, 679 (as to quality in respect of any deficiency capable
of certain estimation) ; LEAKE ON CoNmAcs (7th ed. i9mI) 865 (any matter
which admits of it including the rents and profits derived) ; 2 STORY, EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE (I4th ed. I918) § lo67 (title, quantity, quality, or description
or any other matter touching the estate).
' See POMEROY, DART, LEAKE, AND STORY, all op. cit. supra note 7.
'Erskine v. Adeane, L. R 8 Ch. App. 756 (1871); dissenting opinion in
Schmidt v. Greenwood, 32 N. Z. L. R. 241 (19ii) and cases cited. Contra:
64 U. or PA.
Rutherford v. Acton-Adams, [1915] A. C. 866, noted in (i916)
L. RFv. 635 (miles of fencing).
" Rudd v. Lascelles, [igoo] I Ch. 815; POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 7, § 448;
WTuisToN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1436.
' POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 7, § 436.
See Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 27 HARv.
L. REv. 415. Allowed in England. See 19 MEws DIGEST (1924) 603, citing
Connor v. Potts, [1897] r I. R. 534.
"See I Am s, CASES ON EQUITY (19o4) 251, note I.
" See Dyer v. Hargrave, io Ves. 505 (Eng. i8o5) (repair of house); Grant
v. Munt, G. Coop. 174 (Eng. 1815) (misstatement as to state of cultivation of
land) ; Cann v. Cann, 3 Sir. 447 (Eng. 1830) (rent and profits derived; where
no recovery at law, recouped out of purchase price); Palmer v. Johnson, 12
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gone beyond the position indicated in the principal case, and it would seem
properly so where the defect is an inherent part of the principal subject-matter
and the suit is one properly brought in the equity court.'
Q. B. D. 32 (883), aff'd in i3 Q. B. D. 351 (1884) (rent overstated. In the
Carn case and the Palmer case there was an agreement as to making good
for errors in description. The former case is important in that it handles the
tort question, apparently the greatest barrier to the New York court) ; Powell
v. Elliot, L. R. io Ch. App. 424 (1875) (misrepresentation as to the annual
profits of a colliery); Logwood v. Holland, 131 Va. i86, 1o8 S. E. 571 (1921)
(shortage in number of trees) ; Light v. Grant, 73 W. Va. 56, 79 S. E. ioi
(1913) (abatement where deficiency of coal in place).
"See cases smtpra note 14.

